כָּל הַמַּתְנֶה עַל מַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל תְּנַאי שֶׁיֵּשׁ מַעֲשֶׂה בִתְחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ בָטֵל. וְכָל שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר לוֹ לְקַיְּמוֹ בְסוֹפוֹ, וְהִתְנָה עָלָיו מִתְּחִלָּתוֹ, תְּנָאוֹ קַיָּם:
Si uno hace una condición contraria a lo que está escrito en la Torá, su condición es nula. [Toda esta Mishná está de acuerdo con R. Meir, quien sostiene que si uno hace una condición contraria a lo que está escrito en la Torá, incluso con respecto al dinero, su condición es nula. Esta no es la halajá. Pero, en asuntos monetarios, incluso si uno hace una condición contraria a lo que está escrito en la Torá, su condición se mantiene.] Y cada condición precedida por un acto es nula. [Si él precedió el acto previsto a la condición deseada, por ejemplo, "Esto es tuyo, si haces esto y esto" (la condición es nula). Porque no es como la condición de los hijos de Gad y los hijos de Reuven, a saber. (Números 32:29): "Si pasan ... entonces darás, etc." donde la condición precede al acto.] Y cualquiera que sea (condición) puede cumplirse al final, si él lo estipula al principio, [la condición está precedida del acto], la condición se mantiene. [Pero si no es posible cumplir la condición, la condición es nula y el acto se mantiene. Porque (al plantear esta condición imposible), él solo está hiperbolizando, en realidad no tiene la intención de la condición, sino que solo desea burlarse e incitar a su vecino con palabras.]
Tosefta Kiddushin
(Translated from the Ehrfurt manuscript:) Any stipulation which has the action at the beginning, such a stipulation is invalid. How so? [If he, the brother-in-law whose brother died, said to her, his dead brother's wife,] "Now that I have released you from the levirate bond, with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is divorced [since he already released her with halitzah]. "Now that I have had sex with you, [be betrothed to me] with the understanding that my father is happy about it", even if his father doesn't want this—she is betrothed [since they already had sex, the stipulation is void]. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father wants it—she is betrothed, for she only had sex because of that original condition. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar had a pneumonic: Any stipulation which is possible to do oneself or with an agent and he stipulated about it—his stipulation stands; but any stipulation that is impossible to do except with his body and he stipulated about it—his stipulation is void. How so? "Behold I divorce you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is divorced; but if he doesn't want it—she is not divorced. "Behold I betroth you with the understanding that my father is happy about it", if the father wants it—she is betrothed; but if he doesn't want it—she is not betrothed.
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Tosefta Ketubot
Rabbi Yehudah says: [The husband] can always eat the fruits' fruit [i.e. the interest's interest, even if he said in the ketubah that he gives up access to the fruit from her property]. How so? He can sell the fruit and buy with [that money] land, and he can eat the fruit. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and Rabbi Yohanan ben Berokah say: If she dies, he inherits it [the fruit, even if he said he wouldn't have access to it in the ketubah], for she made a stipulation against what was written in the Torah and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is null and void.
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